In the struggle to create a participatory and tolerant political culture, few observers have called attention to a powerful weapon in the arsenal of any government that seeks to bring democracy to Iraq. This weapon is the historical memory of the Iraqi nationalist movement that took shape before World War I. As the Ottoman Empire disintegrated and alienated its Arab subjects by imposing an increasingly Turkish, as opposed to Islamic, identity, the idea of a modern Iraqi nation-state was formed.

Early on, the Iraqi nationalist movement manifested important characteristics, namely inter-ethnic group cooperation, tolerance of cultural difference, support for a secular definition of Iraqi political community and a commitment to norms of social justice. Examples of ethnic cooperation included attempts by Sunni and Shiite Arab notables to create an Arabic-language education system in the early 20th century, their united opposition to the British invasion of Iraq in 1914, and support for the revolution against British colonial rule from June to October 1920, where there was a demand for "complete Iraqi independence."

The 1920 revolution was significant for its ecumenical character. Sunni and Shiite Arabs prayed in each other's mosques, celebrated each other's religious observances and competed to develop the best nationalist poetry. Poets from urban centers exhorted Iraqis throughout the countryside to join the revolt, thus creating a truly national uprising. In urban areas, Muslim nationalists called upon Iraq's Jews (the largest ethnic group in Baghdad in 1920) and Christians to join nationalist demonstrations, arguing that they too were full Iraqi citizens. Notably, Iraq's Shiite clerics did not call for an Islamic state, but fully supported the idea of a democratic and largely secular state.

This spirit of inter-ethnic cooperation and tolerance continued after the 1920 revolution. All Iraq's ethnic groups protested British efforts to impose a new political system in 1924 and 1925, as well as sectarian based efforts in 1928 to dismiss a Lebanese school teacher, Anis Nsouli, because he had published a book that some Shiite clerics found offensive. Iraqis organized a general strike in 1931 that forced the British to rescind oppressive municipal fees throughout Iraq. In 1948, 1952 and 1956, Iraqis joined national uprisings to demand democracy and social justice from the Hashemite monarchy and its British overlords. When the Hashemites temporarily relaxed state repression in June 1954, Iraq held largely fair and open elections.

Iraqis demonstrated, until the first Baathist regime seized power and imposed authoritarian rule in February 1963, an impressive ability to organize the institutions of a nascent civil society. By 1963, a large number of labor unions, professional associations, women's organizations, artisan associations, literary salons and artist ateliers had been formed. Under the Hashemite monarchy, programmatic political parties such as the National Party, the Ahali Group, the Iraqi Communist Party, and, after World War II, the National Democratic and Independence parties, pushed for greater political participation and social justice for society's poor and less fortunate.

The rapid expansion of Iraq's venerable coffee-house culture, along with a large and vigorous press, underscored the populace's desire to engage in cross-ethnic and cross-regional political discourse, belying the idea that Iraqis did not have a strong sense of belonging to a unitary nation-state. After World War II, advances in literature, such as the Free Verse Movement, and in the plastic arts, spread the progressive message of the Iraqi nationalist movement throughout the Arab world.

Iraqi historical memory also informs us that Brigadier Abdel-Karim Qassem (1958-1963), while authoritarian, ruled Iraq in a nonsectarian and uncorrupt manner. Qassem, a decorated hero in the 1948 Palestine war, minimized state-sponsored violence, even refusing to execute his arch-rival, Colonel Abdel-Salam Aref, who tried to have Qassem killed in 1958. After Aref and the Baathists overthrew and executed Qassem in February 1963, they were unable to tarnish his memory, since he never owned civilian clothes and gave all his government salary to the poor.

After returning to power in July 1968, the second Baathist regime organized a "Project for the Rewriting of History," headed by Saddam Hussein, ostensibly to re-appropriate understandings of Iraq's past that had purportedly been dominated by the writings of colonialists and their local underlings. During the 1970s, the Baath used Iraq's burgeoning oil wealth to finance a cultural production industry designed to expunge from the historical record all accomplishments of groups deemed threatening to its authoritarian rule. Thus, the Baath sought to negate the nationalist movement's progress in promoting civil society and democracy in Iraq.

As the Baathist regime ultimately learned, political rule can only endure when based upon the consent of the governed. To generate support for democracy and political tolerance, the present interim Iraqi government could turn the Baath's "Project for the Rewriting of History" on its head. Civics education could be rewritten to emphasize that democratic and tolerant values were an integral part of the mainstream of the Iraqi nationalist movement and therefore are "culturally authentic," not imported and imposed from without. The political and social history described earlier could be amplified through the writings and interviews of older Iraqi political activists and intellectuals who know that era well. Television, film, the press and the internet could easily be used to disseminate this positive historical memory.

Following the Qassem regime's example, the new government could also promote popular folklore as a vehicle for emphasizing commonalities, often traceable to ancient Mesopotamia, that transcend ethnic boundaries. The popularity of the Majallat al-Turath al-Shaabi (Journal of Popular Culture) and the former television program "Baghdadiyaat," demonstrate the Iraqis' strong interest in folklore, both of Iraq's Mesopotamian and Arab past, and of the contemporary era. While Saddam Hussein attempted to use folklore to strengthen his cult of personality, democratically minded Iraqi governments can, instead, use the egalitarian norms inherent in Iraqi folklore to build a new, anti-authoritarian understanding of political community built around the idea of social justice.

Historical memory alone cannot solve Iraq's current political problems. But it can give all Iraqis greater hope in the future by encouraging them to reflect upon a rich period in their nation's history when all ethnic groups cooperated to promote a tolerant and just society. The legacy of the Baath's chauvinistic pan-Arabism, which repressed the contributions to Iraqi culture and society by Shiites, Kurds, intellectuals and artists, will not easily be overcome. Nevertheless, disseminated in an open and factual manner, the historical memory of the Iraqi nationalist movement's contributions can provide an important building block in the process of creating a truly democratic society in Iraq.

Thursday, July 01, 2004
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